System Engineering and Productivity

System Engineering and Productivity

A Game theory Approach to Investigate the Effect of Inspection in Preventing the Production of Low-Quality Drugs, Considering the Possibility of Offering a Bribe from the Manufacturer to the Supervisor

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors
Mohammad Amin Nabi-Sarvestani 1
Soroush Safarzadeh 2
1 M.Sc., Department of Industrial Engineering, Faculty of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Isfahan University of Technology, Isfahan, Iran
2 Corresponding author: Assistant Professor, Department of Industrial Engineering, Faculty of Engineering Science, Quchan University of Technology, Quchan, Iran
10.22034/msb.2024.2037103.1219
Abstract
In recent years, a large number of incidents related to counterfeit or low-quality drugs have occurred in various countries. Since medicine is considered an important and strategic commodity, it must be ensured that it is safe and sound. For this reason, governments must exercise this care and adopt preventive approaches to prevent counterfeit and low-quality drugs from entering the health cycle. One of the common tools to prevent this is inspection. This inspection can be carried out with or without prior notice. Also, in the inspections that are carried out, some companies may offer bribes to experts and inspectors so that they do not send the inspection report correctly. In the present problem, which involves a drug manufacturer and an inspector, we intend to examine for the first time the concept of offering bribes in inspections and, given the multifactorial nature of the problem, model and solve it with a game theory approach. In this regard, various scenarios have been considered based on the possibility of detecting defects and accepting or not accepting the proposed bribe. The results of the numerical analysis of the problem show that depending on the number of crimes and bribes proposed, it is possible for policymakers to control and monitor manufactured products.
Suggested, it is possible to control and monitor the manufactured products by the policy maker

Highlights

  • The increase in counterfeit or low-quality drugs calls for stricter government inspections.
  • Inspections, whether announced or unannounced, can be influenced by bribery attempts.
  • Game theory models explore scenarios involving bribery in drug inspections for effective policy-making.

Keywords
Drug monitoring
Healthcare system
Game theory
Bribery
Subjects

Copyright ©, Mohammad Amin Nabi-Sarvestani, Soroush Safarzadeh

 

License

This article is released under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) license. Anyone is free to copy, share, translate, and adapt this article for any purpose, whether commercial or non-commercial, as long as proper citation is given to the authors and original publication.

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System Engineering and Productivity
Volume 4, Issue 3 - Serial Number 12
Serial No. 12, Autumn Quarterly
Autumn 2024
Pages 49-62

  • Receive Date 30 July 2024
  • Revise Date 11 September 2024
  • Accept Date 20 September 2024
  • First Publish Date 17 October 2024
  • Publish Date 17 October 2024